Abstract: Many biases plague the estimation of rent sharing in labour markets. Using a Portuguese matched employer-employee panel, these biases are addressed in this paper in three complementary ways: 1) Controlling directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will, ceteris paribus, have lower net-of-wages profits. 2) Instrumenting profits via interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports in total sales of firms. 3) Considering firm or worker fixed effects. These approaches are shown to clarify conflicting findings in the literature. From our preferred specifications, robust to a number of competitive interpretations, we bound Lester ranges of pay dispersion between 22% and 56%.
Introduction
Do firms share rents with their workers? A standard competitive model predicts that there is no relationship between workers' wages and the profits of their firms. Firms that face a sudden increase in profits -because, for instance, market conditions improve substantially -have no reason, from the point of view of the competitive paradigm, to share some of these rents with their workers. The latter are simply paid the opportunity cost of their time, which is determined in the labour market and therefore not affected by the profitability of the firm.
However, a number of alternative, non-competitive models predict a positive correlation between rents and wages of comparable workers. For instance, bargaining models find that workers will receive wages in excess of their best alternative, and that this difference will depend positively on their firms' rents. Similar results are obtained in fairness and risk-sharing models.
Given these conflicting theoretical results, empirical studies have an important role in illuminating this debate. Unfortunately, the estimation of rent-sharing effects incurs in a number of potential biases that have prevented a satisfactory solution to this question. These biases include the one due to the standard accounting relationship between profits and wages (so that higher rent-sharing will decrease profits and thus lead to the underestimation of rent-sharing effects); the potentially simultaneous determination of profits, wages and employment; the correlation between profits and missing variables that capture workers' ability; and measurement error. This paper addresses these biases by exploiting a Portuguese matched employer-employee panel for the 1993-1995 period. First of all, we address the downward bias induced by the accounting relationship. This is achieved this by drawing on a different measure of profits that also follows from a standard bargaining model but which we argue is more appropriate for the purpose of estimating rent sharing. This new variable, gross profits per worker (or net profits per worker plus average yearly wages per firm) allows one to control directly for the fact that, ceteris paribus, higher wages will depress net profits and thus lead to a smaller rent-sharing coefficient. As far as we know, such a variable has never been used before, possibly because other data sets do not include such information.
In effect, our data set includes information (including wages) of all workers of each firm. From this, and making some assumptions about employer taxes, we computed wage bills per firm and total profits before wage costs.
Secondly, we use an instrumental-variable technique to uncover the endogeneous nature of profits.
Our instrument, again warranted by the theoretical model, is obtained from the interaction between exchange rates (an exogenous price shifter) and the share of exports in total sales of each firm.
Differences in this instrument across firms and years bring about the exogenous variability in profits used to identify the rent-sharing coefficient. Other papers use instruments also based on international trade: for instance, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) use prices of imports and exports and Teal (1996) uses exchange-rate variation.
2 Finally, we draw on the longitudinal nature of the data to control for firm or worker fixed effects, following papers such as Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) , Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Bronars and Famulari (2001) . Although we also consider a large set of time-variant and time-invariant controls, both at the worker and the firm level, there is still scope for unobserved factors to impact simultaneously upon profits and wages and render the rent-sharing coefficients inconsistent.
Unobserved worker ability or unobserved organisation type are important examples of such variables.
To the extent that these variables are time invariant, our fixed effects models will capture their effect.
On top of the different measure of rents used, this study contributes to the rent-sharing literature by combining controls for unobserved variables and the instrumentation of profits with demand shifters. This is a new stream of research that includes to our knowledge only three contributions: Margolis and Salvanes (2001) , Arai (2001) and Arai and Heyman (2001) . Overall, these papers have documented much smaller estimates of rent sharing than those typically obtained in the literature that focuses on the endogeneity of profits; and either smaller or similar results to those of the stream of the literature that controls for time-invariant characteristics.
In Margolis and Salvanes (2001) , the authors examine the degree of rent sharing in France and Norway, using large matched employer-employee panel data sets, by progressively adding further controls to their wage equations. In their final specification, which includes controls for industries, business cycle effects, fixed worker and firm effects and an instrument, Margolis and Salvanes eliminate the rent-sharing coefficient in France but not in Norway.
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In Arai and Heyman (2001) , a large Swedish matched panel with information for 1991 and 1995 is used and robust evidence of rent sharing is found. Once again, rent-sharing estimates increase substantially when profits are instrumented (with survey evidence on the degree of product-market competition faced by each firm): Lester ranges (a measure of wage dispersion between firms with "high" and "low" profits) go up from 14% to 50%. interpretations of the wages-profits correlations rather than those based on supervision efficiencywages models or short-run demand frictions.
As to our findings, one result concerns the use of gross profits (i.e. profits before the payment of the wage bill but after all other production costs). Not only do we confirm the anticipated downward bias brought by the accounting relationship mentioned above, but we also find that the difference between the two regressors fades away as more controls (including worker or firm fixed effects) are considered. This is consistent with the result that weak instruments may do more harm than good (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995) and that the use of extra controls strengthens the role of the instruments in identifying the equation.
More specifically, we find that estimates using instrumental variables tend to overestimate the amount of rent sharing if controls for firm or worker characteristics are missing. This upward bias also occurs if the measure of rent sharing used (typically net profits) is less correlated with the instrument than our alternative measure (gross profits). These results support the suspicions of Oswald (1996) , who regarded some IV estimates as too large to be credible. In Abowd and Lemieux (1993) , for instance, instrumented Lester ranges exceed 90%.
Overall, we find evidence of a significant and substantial amount of rent sharing in our data. Lester ranges are bound between 22% and 56%. Our results are shown to be robust to a number of other competitive interpretations, such as industry-specific shocks, differences in capital intensity and, most importantly, the use of overtime. We also find that groups of workers one may expect to have more bargaining power inside the firm benefit more from rent sharing, as suggested by bargaining models of rent sharing but not fairness models, for instance.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a bargaining model that motivates the empirical work done in the paper. Section 3 presents the data set and the instrument used. Sections 4 present the results and Section 5 addresses their robustness. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Theory
One way to explore theoretically the extent of rent sharing in a labour market involves modelling wage and employment determinations as a Nash bargaining problem, in which employers and workers choose employment and wage levels. In this framework, common in the literature, wages are derived from the solution to the following problem:
(1)
where w represents the wage rate, N the employment level, x is the alternative wage and φ the bargaining power of workers. π are ('net') profits, which are defined as θF(N,K)-wN-rK, in which θ is a demand shifter, F(.) the production function (assumed without loss of generality to depend only on labour and capital), r the interest rate, and K the capital stock From the first order condition with respect to wages and after some algebra, one obtains an empirically testable wage equation:
φ This specification suggests that wages should be regressed on a measure of the alternative wage of workers and on average revenues per worker net of wages and capital costs. However, should one estimate this specification, one must acknowledge the many problems involved in identifying the coefficient of interest. One issue is that wages affect both the left-and the right-hand side of the equation, given the accounting relationship between wages and (net-of-wages) profits. This induces a downward bias in the estimation of the rent-sharing parameter.
To deal with this bias, we consider an alternative specification that can also be obtained from the first order condition with respect to wages:
According to the latter specification, wages should be regressed, as before, on a measure of the reservation wage and, differently than before, on average quasi-rents. This specification, followed in Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Estevão and Tevlin (2000) , seems more appropriate as it focuses on the difference between revenues per worker and the alternative wage each worker could obtain, which then measures the rents that may or may not be shared by the firm. One problem with this specification, is that one has to estimate in a first step the alternative wage of each worker, a process that typically involves some untested assumptions.
In order to deal with the problems of the previous two specifications, this paper will follow a slightly modified version of (3), where total revenues and the reservation wage are two separate terms:
This specification allows the model to estimate simultaneously the degree of rent sharing (captured by the parameter φ) and the role of the workers' characteristics in the determination of their alternative wage. We will thus focus on equation (4), contrasting its results with those based on equation (2). In simultaneously for fixed effects and the endogeneity of profits. the former case, the key regressor will be total revenues per worker minus non-labour costs (which in the model are represented by capital costs only). This regressor will be proxied by accounting profits per worker plus the average wage per firm.
Other biases may still affect our results. One such bias would arise if the assumption of "strongly efficient" contracts followed in equation (1) is relaxed. This assumption posits that firms and workers (or unions) decide simultaneously on wages and employment. However, it may be more reasonable to assume instead that unions determine wages and firms choose employment levels, as in "right-tomanage" models.
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In this case, employment is determined by the contracted wage and not by the alternative wage, as in "strongly efficient" contracts. This result suggests that rents will be highly endogeneous, as employment and wages are simultaneously determined.
Another potential source of bias is related to efficiency-wages models. Again, if productivity depends on wages, then rents will also depend on wages. Additionally, a control for average profitability in a micro-level wage regression may pick up some of the firm or worker heterogeneity not captured by other variables considered in the specification. This missing-variable problem is then likely to bias upwards the profitability coefficient, to the extent that, for instance, workers better skilled along unobservable dimensions are more likely to be allocated to more profitable firms.
Finally, further bias will occur if there is measurement error in the rents per worker variable.
Typically, measurement error attenuates estimates towards zero, particularly with differenced data.
This would make the case of rent sharing even stronger. However, this result may be inverted if measurement error becomes non-random, for instance if firms spread losses across periods so to reduce their tax liabilities. (See Margolis and Salvanes (2001) for a discussion of this case.) Fortunately, these biases may be removed if one uses exogenous variation in profitability induced by movements of the θ parameter. 6 As equations (2)-(4) make clear, any source of variation of profits that does not impact directly upon wages is a valid instrument. However, the IV methodology requires some caution, as various authors, including Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock 8 (1997) , have shown that the biases induced by weak instruments may be more serious than the biases one incurs when not accounting for simultaneity at all. This "weak instruments" result is another reason why we favour a gross profits specification, as instruments that are based on movements of the θ parameter will exhibit stronger correlations with gross than net profits.
Data
The main data source used in this study is a matched employer-employee panel, Personnel Records ('Quadros de Pessoal'), which covers the Portuguese economy since the early 1980's. These data include several variables about firms (industry, location, firm size, domestic/foreign ownership, sales, equity, etc) and several variables about each one of all employees at each firm (schooling, age, tenure, gender, different measures of earnings, hours worked, etc). Identifiers for both firm and employees are also present, allowing one to construct a panel.
The Personnel Records data set does not include information on profits (or exports). These latter data were obtained from a survey of annual reports of large firms headquartered in Northern Portugal. This survey (Jornal de Notícias, 1994 , 1995 covers only the period 1993-1995, thus constraining our analysis to those three years. The two data sources were then matched, producing the data set used in this study. (Appendix 1 presents a more detailed description of each data source and of the method used to merge the data.) After dropping observations with missing cells and restricting the sample to firms in the manufacturing sector, our data set draws on more than 44,000 workers and more than 75,000 workersyear. There are 91 firms, which correspond to 197 firms-year. The most important industry is the textiles and clothing industry, which includes more than 60% of workers in each year. Some descriptive statistics of the key variables used are presented, in terms of workers-year, in Appendix 2. The top panel presents descriptive statistics of variables measured at the worker level while the bottom panel concerns the same variables but measured by averages across firms-year. For instance, while the average years of schooling attainment of workers is 5.4, the same (unweighted) average across firms is 5.8. All monetary values are deflated by the retail price index and are measured in 1993 prices.
As mentioned before, the measurement of profits is a topic of particular interest in this paper. The first profits variable presented in Tables A1 and A2 , 'Net Profits (per Worker)' corresponds to the standard version available in the literature. The second, 'Gross Profits (per Worker)', is obtained after adding the wage bill per worker (or the average wage per worker) in each firm and is the one used in the empirical implementation of equation (4). This wage bill is computed from aggregating the information of all workers in each firm. As wages are available for one month only, we assume that the total wage bill of each worker is 14 times that, plus the employer-paid taxes. 9 We find that gross profits per worker are between four and six times bigger than net profits (depending on whether we look at worker or firm averages, respectively). This underlines the importance of wage bills in the total costs faced by firms.
Finally, we also present statistics about the share of exports in total sales. The average share (within firms that exhibit a positive level of exports) is of 48% for workers and 41% for firms. It is this variable, the share of exports in total sales, interacted with exchange rates, that is used as an instrument for profits. The rationale for this choice is that increases (decreases) in exchange rates will make exports more (less) expensive, thus creating an exogenous impact, of a longitudinal nature, upon each firm's demand. Moreover, such exchange-rate variability is likely to impact firms differently, depending on the openness of each firm to international trade, which is captured by the share of exports in total sales of each firm.
The period and country considered in this paper are particularly well suited for this instrument. Not only Portugal is a small open economy -and thus unable to affect the international prices of the large majority of the products the country trades -, as the 1993-95 period proved to be a turbulent period from the point of view of exchange rates. During these years, and particularly between 1992 and 1993, the European Monetary System witnessed large fluctuations in its Exchange Rate Mechanism currencies, following the macroeconomic imbalances created by the German reunification.
As far as the Portuguese currency is concerned, and as documented in Figure 1 in terms of the effective exchange rate, there was a substantial depreciation over the first six months of 1993. The Escudo had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System in April 1992. A first devaluation (of 6%) occurred in September 1992, a second (of 6.5%) in May 1993 -after which the ERM bands were widened from 6% to 15% -and a third (of 3.5%) in March 1995. As the figure shows, the value of the currency, measured in effective exchange rates (i.e. weighted by trade shares), dropped considerably over 1993 and up to mid-1994. The escudo then picked up some of its value until the end of 1995. 
Results

OLS Results, Pooled Data
The first set of results, presented in this subsection, focus on key relationships between the two types of profits and wages, under different sets of control variables. At this stage, the biases brought by the lack of full controls for worker and firm heterogeneity and the possible simultaneous determination of profits are ignored. We also do not consider the panel nature of the data, as we simply pool the data about the same workers in different years. Our goal here is simply to take a first look on the biases induced by controlling for net, rather than gross, profits per worker. The wage equation considered is the following:
(5) y it = X it 'β 1 + F it 'β 2 + β 3 π j(i,t),t + ε it , J a n 1 9 9 6 A b r 1 9 9 6 J u l 1 9 9 6 O u t
Year and Month
Index
End of crawling-peg
Nominal convergence towards Euro.
Monetary turbulence in EMS; Escudo realigned its central exchange rate.
Nominal convergence again. where y it denotes the logarithm of (real) hourly wages of worker i in period t. X it is a set of human capital variables: six dummies denoting different schooling levels, a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure -measured in months -, and a gender dummy. F it is a set of firm characteristics: six industry dummies, three region dummies, controls for firm size -in terms of the log number of employees and log real sales, and a foreign-ownership dummy.
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π j(i,t),t denotes (either net or gross) real profits per worker in period t at the firm (j) of worker i in period t. Finally, ε it is an error term with the standard assumptions. Standard errors are corrected to take into account heteroskedasticity related to the fact that most workers are present in the sample more than one period.
The rent-sharing coefficients for net and gross profits are presented in the first two columns of Table   1 , for specifications with no other regressors except for two year dummies. As expected, we find that the first coefficient (.04), for net profits, is substantially smaller than the second (.107), for gross profits. Moreover, the measure of goodness of fit indicates that gross profits play a much better role in predicting wages than net profits. The profit-elasticities of wages are also very different, at 1.4% for net profits and 22.1% for gross profits.
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However, these two elasticities are not strictly comparable, as they refer to percentage increases of two very different types of profits: as shown before, net profits are substantially smaller than gross profits. For this reason, Lester ranges are a better way of comparing the degree of rent sharing across different specifications. Using this method, the Lester range is 23% for net profits and 65% for gross profits.
In the second pair of columns of Table 1 , we replicate this analysis but adding controls for worker characteristics. We find, for both measures of profits, smaller coefficients, elasticities and Lester ranges. This means that, as expected, more skilled workers are employed in firms with higher profits.
Another result is that the three measures of rent sharing remain smaller when net profits are used.
Similar results are obtained in the last pair of columns of this Table, which add controls for firm characteristics. Once again all measures of rent sharing decline, indicating a correlation between firm characteristics and profits, and all measures of rent sharing remain bigger under gross profits. The 11 The inclusion of firm controls in this specification is not obvious from the point of view of a simple competitive model of the labour market. From that perspective, only individual characteristics should matter in wage determination, except if firm controls captured compensating differentials. However, the inclusion of firm controls can also be warranted if firm characteristics pick up some extra worker traits that affect wages and are also correlated with firm profitability. Such an extended specification will therefore amount to a more stringent test of rent sharing. 12 Mean elasticities in a log-level regression are given by the product of the coefficient and the mean of the regressor. coefficient for net profits even becomes negative under this specification, leading to a Lester range of -3% while the corresponding figure under gross profits is 23%. These results confirm the prediction that rent sharing is underestimated when one does not account for the fact that, ceteris paribus, higher wages translate into lower profits. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (using Stata's "cluster" option, at the worker level). + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 'Human capital' controls are six dummies for education levels, a quartic in (Mincer) experience, a quadratic in tenure, and a gender dummy. 'Firm characteristics' are seven dummies for industries, log number of workers, log real sales, a foreign firm dummy, and three region dummies. Two dummies for years are also included in all specifications. As a test of the robustness of the results, we also considered specifications that include one-year lags of the profit variables. This is motivated by the fact that past profitability will be pre-determined at the year under study. Moreover, wages in the 'Personnel Records' data set refer to specific months (March in 1993 and October in 1994 while profits refer to the full year. As an additional test of robustness, and in order to facilitate the comparison of these results with those of the following subsections, we run the same regressions with the sub-sample of workers whose firms export (this is the sample considered when the instrument is used). We find, under both the specification with lags and that with the exporting firms sub-sample, the same ranking and similar values for the profits coefficients as in the main regressions. (These results are not reported but are available upon request.) 4.
Yes
Instrumental Variables, Pooled Data
In this sub-section, we address the simultaneity between wages and profits via a 2SLS technique. In the top part of Table 2 , we present the coefficients (and standard errors) of the instrument in the auxiliary regression that predicts profits per worker.
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In the first two columns, which refer to specifications with controls for human capital but not firm characteristics, the instrument is found to be highly significant and with the expected negative sign. This negative sign means that the greater the openness of the firm to the external market (as measured by the share of exports in total sales), the greater the (negative) impact of an increase (i.e. appreciation) of the exchange rate of the escudo upon the firm's profits.
The two key indicators of instrument quality (as suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995) are very favourable. As to the main regression, we find that the profits coefficients have both increased considerably, but especially in the case of net profits. In this case, Lester ranges jump from 18% to 121% while for gross profits, these ranges increase from 41% to 78%. (The Lester range for net profits is broadly in line with similar estimates, such as those of Lemieux, 1993, and van Reenen, 1996 .) Our interpretation of this upward bias, for net profits, is that, since the instruments typically used in the literature act as exogenous demand shifters, they will be much better predictors of profits before the wage bill (i.e. total revenues minus the costs of non-labour inputs only) than of profits after the wage bill (i.e. total revenues minus total costs, including those of labour). In the two remaining columns of Table 2 we replicate the 2SLS results in specifications that also include firm characteristics. We find that, in this case, the results become unstable, particularly in the net specification, where the Lester range falls to -49%. This is related to the poor performance of the instrument, as measured by the partial R-squared and the F statistic, which arises because the firm controls are strongly correlated with the instruments, leaving little explanatory power for the latter and decreasing the precision of the profit regressors. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (GMM estimator) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 'Human capital' controls are six dummies for education levels, a quartic in (Mincer) experience, a quadratic in tenure, and a gender dummy. 'Firm characteristics' are seven dummies for industries, log number of workers, log real sales, a foreign firm dummy, and three region dummies. Two dummies for years are also included in all specifications. The instrument used is the interaction between exchange rates and the shares of exports in total sales. 
Yes
Instrumental Variables, Firm Effects
In this sub-section, we explicitly take into account the panel nature of the data set and estimate models of the following type:
(6) y it = X it 'β 1 + F it 'β 2 + β 2 π j(i,t),t + λ j(i,t) + ε it , where λ j(i,t) denotes a fixed effect for the firm of worker i at period t.
The inclusion of firm fixed effects implies that any evidence of rent sharing will now be derived from within-firm differences in profits across time. This is the price one pays for the benefit of accounting for any time-invariant differences across firms. Such differences may include different working practices (e.g. monitoring vs. incentives) that may impact differently the firm's profitability.
The results are presented in Table 3 . In column A, when profits are not instrumented and net profits are considered, one obtains a negative rent-sharing coefficient. This result is induced by the downward bias incurred whenever net profits are used. However, this bias is not counterweighted as before by the much higher profitability of firms that pay higher wages, as estimation focus only on within-firm differences. This problem is addressed in column B, where the consideration of gross profits renders the just-mentioned downward bias irrelevant. As expected, in this new specification, rent sharing is positive, with a Lester range of 8%.
In the following columns of Table 3 , the simultaneous nature of profits is again addressed. In columns C and D, for specifications that include controls for human capital, the instrument again performs well, with the predicted negative sign, partial R 2 's of .0047 and .0077 and F-statistics of 272 and 448. The rent-sharing coefficients are precisely determined, corresponding to Lester ranges of 39% and 34%.
The latter values are much smaller than those obtained for the equivalent specifications of Table 2 .
The differences between gross and net profits also decline substantially.
In columns E and F, controls for firm characteristics are added. Unlike in the same specification of and F-statistics above 2,000 in both cases. Lester ranges are 24% and 23% for net and gross profits, respectively. We therefore find that Lester ranges fall further with respect to the specification without firm controls and the difference between net and gross profits is no longer significant. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (GMM estimator). + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 'Human capital' controls are six dummies for education levels, a quartic in (Mincer) experience, a quadratic in tenure, and a gender dummy. 'Firm characteristics' are seven dummies for industries, log number of workers, log real sales, a foreign firm dummy, and three region dummies. Two dummies for years are also included in all specifications. The instrument used is the interaction between exchange rates and the shares of exports in total sales. 
Yes
Instrumental Variables, Worker Effects
In this sub-section, worker (instead than firm) fixed effects are considered. The motivation for this is that the workforce of each firm may vary in unobservable ways that are also correlated with profitability. Here we will estimate models of the following type:
where ν i denotes the worker fixed effect.
It is important to underline that, unlike before, this approach does not capture time-invariant firm effects as our model does not include both worker and firm dummies. The latter approach (adopted by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999) is not followed for two reasons. Firstly, identification of firm effects would require job movers between firms in our sample, which exist in a very small number (less than 300) and have different characteristics from job stayers. Secondly, such identification assumes that job mobility is exogenous. However, the nature of the displacement, searching and matching processes suggests that the latter assumption may be too strong.
The results are presented in Table 4 . One finds now that non-instrumented results are positive but very small, with Lester ranges of 1%, for net profits and 10% for the gross profits specification. However, when one takes into account the remaining sources of endogeneity via the use of the instrument, in columns C and D, the coefficients and Lester ranges are substantially smaller than in other equivalent specifications. (As before, it is found that Lester ranges are much more sensitive to instrumentation under the net profits specification, as they jump from 1% to 15%, whereas, under the gross profits specification, they increase from 10% to 15%.) Additionally, in the most complete specification of Table 4 , there are not significant differences between net and gross profits. In particular, the Lester ranges in this case are both 15% with controls for human capital only and 12% with controls for human capital and firms characteristics.
One possible reason for the very small Lester ranges in the specifications with worker fixed effects is that the Portuguese employment law (as that of other European countries) makes it very difficult for employers to cut pay. Only in a few circumstances is this allowed, usually when the firm may become bankrupt due to lack of demand and/or increasing costs.
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This feature of the labour market would generate an asymmetry in the relationship between individual wage growth and profit growth (the variables considered in fixed effects estimation at the worker level) if rent sharing were to exist. In this case, while profits increased wages would also increase but while profits fell wages would not fall (at least in nominal terms). This would bias downward the rent-sharing coefficient and possibly explain the very low Lester ranges documented in Table 4 . 16 According to Article 21 st , Law ("Decreto-Lei") 49,408, 24 November 1969, "The employer is forbidden to: … c) cut pay (except in the cases foreseen in the law, after authorisation from the National Institute of Labour, should the worker agree)."
We follow Arai and Heyman (2001) and test this hypothesis by restricting the sample to those workers whose firms exhibit a positive growth level of their (total nominal) profits. The results, presented in Table 4b , support our interpretation as we find much bigger profits coefficients in this case. In the most complete specification, presented in column D, the Lester range is 56%, rather than the 12% obtained before. (Arai and Heyman (2001) obtain a similar increase with their Swedish data.) Paradoxically, the "competitive" result of Table 4 , which documents little rent sharing, is apparently driven by the rigidity brought by a labour-market institution. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (GMM estimator). + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 'Human capital' controls are six dummies for education levels, a quartic in (Mincer) experience, a quadratic in tenure, and a gender dummy. 'Firm characteristics' are seven dummies for industries, log number of workers, log real sales, a foreign firm dummy, and three region dummies. Two dummies for years are also included in all specifications. The instrument used is the interaction between exchange rates and the shares of exports in total sales. 
Yes
Robustness and Interpretation
There are several ways to test the robustness of the results and, in particular, the extent to which they warrant a non-competitive interpretation of the labour market. In this section, this will be pursued by controlling for extra variables and using a different dependent variable. On the other hand, even if rent sharing can explain these results, other models than bargaining may also be consistent with these findings. In order to shed light on this matter, we will examine differences between groups of workers with possibly different levels of bargaining power. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (GMM estimator). + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 'Human capital' controls are six dummies for education levels, a quartic in (Mincer) experience, a quadratic in tenure, and a gender dummy. 'Firm characteristics' are seven dummies for industries, log number of workers, log real sales, a foreign firm dummy, and three region dummies. Two dummies for years are also included in all specifications. The instrument used is the interaction between exchange rates and the shares of exports in total sales.
Yes No No Yes
Yes Yes No Yes As before, one may consider different specifications and sample definitions. In this section, we follow the specification of Table 4b , column D, which we believe is the most appropriate, for reasons explained above. This specification includes controls for human capital and firm characteristics, worker fixed effects and instrumented gross profits and the sample is restricted to workers whose firm's total nominal profits increase over adjacent years.
Controls for Industry-Year Interactions and Capital Intensity
Up until now, we have assumed that economic shocks hit different industries homogeneously across time. However, our evidence of rent sharing may be driven by the employment and wage adjustments of firms in different industries to economic shocks, if they face positively sloped short-run labour supply curves. This could generate a spurious correlation between wages and profits, even though the most complete specifications already include a control for firm size.
We therefore allow economic shocks to impact different industries differently across the period covered by including interactions between industry and year dummies in our specification. The first column of Table 5a shows that this has no sizeable impact on estimated profits coefficients or Lester ranges -these are now 65%, compared to 56% before. We also control for changes in employment (either total or percentage differences) in the pooled specifications of equation (4) and again find that the coefficients are qualitatively unchanged.
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Another potential objection to a rent-sharing interpretation of these findings lies on the lack of controls for capital intensity. As Bronars and Famulari (2001) argue, capital-intensive firms will hire workers with greater observed and unobserved skills if capital and skilled labour are complements. If the regressions include no control for different degrees of capital intensity across firms, rent-sharing coefficients may simply be picking up the impact of higher unobserved ability.
Although our estimates already control for time-invariant individual-specific unobserved factors, it is possible that capital intensity has a relevant time-variant dimension. We test for this by controlling for the equity level of each firm, which is probably the best proxy for capital available in our data. We find that this variable (used in per worker and real terms) enters the regression significantly (and Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets (GMM estimator). + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Human capital and firm characteristics controls and two year dummies are included in all specifications. The instrument used is the interaction between exchange rates and the shares of exports in total sales. High tenure is defined as more than 36 months. High education is defined as at least 11 years of schooling.
Basic Wages Instead of Total Wages
When faced with demand shocks, firms may respond not by hiring more staff but introducing or increasing overtime. Under this case, the new hourly wage rate of each worker in expanding firms will necessarily increase. This may explain the documented evidence of rent sharing, in this and other papers, which consider total pay (that is, basic plus overtime pay).
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In this sub-section we test the overtime hypothesis by considering only "normal" pay and "normal" hours of work by exploiting the information available on different types of pay, including overtime pay, and also on normal and overtime hours of work. In order to strengthen the test, we do not include in the "normal pay" variable three other components previously used in "total pay" (subsidies, "other payments" and tenure-related pay) which may however be more directly related to normal pay.
By running the same specifications as before with this new dependent variable, log hourly real basic wages, we find a pronounced decline in rent sharing, from a Lester range of 63% to 22% -see the third column of Table 5a . This new figure is however still significant and still indicates a sizeable amount of rent sharing in the labour market.
Tenure, Education and Gender Differences
The motivation for the tests presented in this sub-section lies on evaluating bargaining interpretations of rent sharing in opposition to those stemming from efficiency wages or fairness models. For instance, if highly educated workers have a stronger bargaining power in firms (because they are less easily replaceable, for instance), they would also presumably benefit more from any rent-sharing agreements than other groups of workers. This prediction will not however hold in other models also consistent with rent sharing, such as fairness models.
We conduct the tests by splitting the sample between high-and low-educated workers, high-and lowtenure workers, and men and women, and then running different wage regressions for each group of workers. (Again, the specification and sample considered is the same as that of column D of Table 4b .)
The thresholds we chose to split the samples into different subgroups are more/less than 36 months of tenure (high/low tenure) and completion or not of secondary school (high/low education).
The results, presented in Table 5b , suggest sizeable differences in rent sharing between different groups as predicted by bargaining models. High-tenure workers have significant levels of rent sharing, with a Lester range of 59%, while rent sharing is not significant for the low-tenure workers (although the point estimate suggests a sizeable, but in any case lower Lester range of 38%). Differences between workers with different schooling attainment are even starker. While the Lester range for highly-educated workers is 110%, the same range for little-educated workers is less than half that value (52%). Finally, rent sharing if also very different for men and women. The Lester range for the former is 83% while that for the latter is only 15% (and again not significant). This finding suggests that (differences in) bargaining power may explain a large share of gender wage discrimination. Black and Strahan (2001) find similar evidence of rents being shared mostly with men when studying the wage impacts of the deregulation of the US banking industry. Tenure Education Gender
Conclusions
It is well know that the estimation of rent-sharing effects may suffer from a large number of biases.
This paper tackles this problem in three complementary ways, drawing on a large Portuguese matched employer-employee panel. Firstly, we control directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will, ceteris paribus, have lower net profits. Secondly, we instrument profits via interactions between exchange rates and the share of exports in total sales of firms. Finally, we control for additional sources of heterogeneity, by considering specifications with firm or worker fixed effects.
Our first finding concerns the use of gross profits (i.e. profits before the payment of the wage bill but after all other production costs). Not only do we confirm the anticipated downward bias brought by the accounting relationship mentioned above, but we also find that the difference between the two regressors fades away as more controls (including worker or firm fixed effects) are considered. This is consistent with the result that weak instruments may do more harm than good and that the use of extra controls strengthens the role of the instruments in identifying the equation.
More specifically, we find that estimates using instrumental variables tend to overestimate the amount of rent sharing if controls for firm or worker characteristics are missing. This upward bias also occurs if the measure of rent sharing used (typically net profits) is less correlated with the instrument than our alternative measure (gross profits). These results confirm the suspicions of Oswald (1996) , who regarded some IV estimates as too large to be believable. In Abowd and Lemieux (1993) , for instance, instrumented Lester ranges increase by about ten times with respect to OLS results, leading to a particularly large role of profits differences across firms in terms of the explanation of wage inequality.
Overall, we find in our data evidence of a significant and substantial amount of rent sharing. Lester ranges (a measure of wage dispersion between firms with "high" and "low" profits) are bound between 22% and 56%. The upper bound is obtained in a specification with worker fixed effects, gross profits, a large set of worker and firm controls and in a sub-sample with only those workers whose firms exhibit increasing profits. The lower bound is obtained under the same specification and subsample but in which the dependent variable is restricted to basic pay. This bound is also very close to the results of the specification with firm fixed effects.
Overall, these figures coincide with or exceed those of the other studies that use matched worker-firm panels (Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 , Arai and Heyman, 2001 , and Arai, 2001 . A factor that may have magnified our results is the small number of years covered by our panel, as it is possible that the strong evidence of rent sharing documented here fades away in a longer time period. In such a time frame, workers are more likely to move between firms, competing away the rents earned by workers in firms experiencing positive demand shocks.
However, while this argument may carry some weight, our evidence of rent sharing is shown to be robust to a number of other competitive interpretations, such as industry-specific shocks, differences in capital intensity and, most importantly, the use of overtime. Our estimates also take into account the downward bias induced by downward rigidity in pay, as determined by employment law, which we argue can be a powerful force that leads to the underestimation of rent sharing. Moreover, we find that groups of workers one may expect to have more bargaining power inside the firm (workers with high each firm. Furthermore, each set of characteristics of each individual includes a reference to the firm for which the individual is working in each year.
The fact that the forms prepared by the Ministry of Employment are filled in by the employers should guarantee a high degree of quality and comparability of the data. Furthermore, the record or table for each establishment, with information on each worker (most notably his or her pay and number of hours of work) is to be displayed in a public place at each establishment. This requirement allows the Ministry of Employment to check whether labour regulations (e.g., irregular extra time) are being met.
This requisite should ensure a further layer of quality to the data set.
The samples used in this study concern the manufacturing industries and were subject to a sampling ratio of about 80%, where large firms are over-represented. For instance, in 1995, the universe of the manufacturing sector considers 845,000 workers and 37,500 firms while the sample includes information on approximately 677,000 workers and 12,800 firms. This corresponds to a ratio of 80% of workers but only 34% of firms.
B. The 'Jornal de Noticias' (JN) Survey
This survey is published annually by 'Jornal de Notícias', a leading Portuguese newspaper. The survey presents business information on the top 500 firms (in 1993) or 1000 firms (in 1994 and 1995) 
C. Matching the Two Data Sources
Two variables available in both sources were strictly comparable and thus used directly in the merging process. These variables were the geographical location of the firm and its industry code. Other variables available in both sources were subject to some measurement error and thus had to be considered more carefully: employment, sales and equity.
The source of such measurement error is related to the different time of the year during which the data is collected for each one of the two sources. While the QP data are about March (in 1993) and October (in 1994 and 1995) , the 'Jornal de Notícias' refers to the full year and is thus likely to represent the characteristics of the firm by 31 st December of each year.
The possible number of matches between firms in each data set (after restricting it to firms sharing a given geographical location and industry code) was 49,591. An algorithm for selecting a smaller number of possible matches was then implemented. This procedure borrowed from matching theory and in particular the 'Deferred Acceptance' algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962) .
Our version of this algorithm involved creating a loss function defined in terms of the weighted differences between the values of each one of the latter three matching variables (employment, sales and equity) across a maximum of three years in each data set. This loss function was then used to evaluate all possible matches.
From these results, the best match for each firm in the JN data set was determined. QP firms would then choose the best match within the set of choices they may have. Paired firms would be selected and removed from the sample. This process would then be replicated until all high-quality matches would be found. These matches were determined as those above a threshold in terms of the quality of the match as determined by a maximum value of the loss function. The set of firms obtained from this process was then subject to a new round of inspection, in this occasion subjectively determined by the author. Firms-year for which no information from either one of the two data sources was available were also dropped, after which the final sample of 91 firms and 197 firms-year used in the paper was obtained.
